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University faculty members have shown increasing interest in organizing for collective bargaining and in receiving certification as a
bargaining unit' under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Act). 2 The growth in faculty unionization at private institutions of
higher education is attributable to the current financial crisis which
has resulted in curtailment of academic programs and reduction of
staff. 3 Faculty members have expected unions to protect their interests.4
This recent development of collective bargaining has given rise
to a number of legal issues5 because the traditional industrial
categories of the Act do not encompass university faculty. 6 In NLRB
v. Yeshiva University, 7 the Supreme Court substantially restricted
faculty unionization by upholding the right of Yeshiva University to
refuse to negotiate with a faculty bargaining unit approved by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board).8 The Court emphasized that the full-time faculty niake decisions on curriculum,
standards for admission, grading, degree requirements, and courses,
as well as recommendations on hiring, tenure, promotions, and sabbaticals. 9 Consequently, a sharply divided court held that the members of the faculty at that institution were managerial employees not
entitled to unionize under the NLRA.' 0
I See C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). In 1978, 382
campuses had bargaining units, 251 at two year public community colleges, 51 at public institutions of higher education, and 80 at private colleges and universities. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION,

DIRECTORY OF FAC-

ULTY CONTRACTS AND BARGAINING AGENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

i-ii

(1979).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). The Act authorizes
"[e]mployees ... to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.'" Id. § 157.
a See Hansen, An Era of Continuing Decline: Annual Report on the Economic Status of the
Profession, 1978-1979, 65 Academe: Bulletin of the AAUP 319, 323-24 (1979).

Id. at 327.
5 Sands, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 150,

4

159-66.
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (employee); 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) (supervisur).
7 100 S. Ct. 856 (1980).
8 Id. at 861.
9 Id. at 859-60.
10 Id. at 861. The managerial exclusion has been judicially created in the last six years. See
note 24 infra and accompanying text.
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The Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) filed a petition with the NLRB to represent the full time faculty members at ten
of the thirteen schools of Yeshiva. 1 In December, 1975, after an
extensive hearing, the NLRB granted the petition and directed an
election.' 2 The Union won the election and was certified as a bar3
gaining unit by the Board.'
Contending that the faculty were managerial employees not cov14
ered by the Act, the University refused to bargain with the Union.
An unfair labor practice complaint filed by the Union resulted in a
Board finding that the University had violated the Act, and an order
5
was issued compelling the University to bargain with the Union.'
6
Subsequently, the Board appealed to the court for enforcement.'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the managerial
exclusion and did not decide whether the Yeshiva faculty could be
excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRA as supervisors.1 7 Instead,
the appellate court found that the Yeshiva full-time faculty were "substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise," and were thereby
excluded from NLRA coverage as managerial employees. 18
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 19 A
majority opinion authored by Justice Powell, expressing the view of
five members of the Court, 2 0 held that the NLRB had no power
2
to order Yeshiva University to bargain with the faculty union. '

11 Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B.
12 Id. at 1057.
13 100 S.

1053, 1053 (1975).

Ct. at 860.

14 Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (1977).
15 Id. at 600. In the unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board found that the University
had violated the section of the Act which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title;
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (5) (1976).
16 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
17 Id. at 703.
18 Id. at 698. The court concluded that the full-time faculty were managerial because they
played a "crucial role . ..in determining ...central policies of the institution including, inter
alia, the curriculum, admission and graduation requirements, [and] tuition." Id.
19 100 S. Ct. at 861.
20 Id. at 858. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in
the majority opinion.
21 Id. at 861.
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Acknowledging the authority of the Board to include university faculty members within the purview of the Act, 2 2 the Court agreed with
23
the Board's characterization of the faculty as professional employees.
Professional employees, however, may be excluded from NLRA
coverage under supervisory or managerial exemptions. 2 4 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Board's contention that the participation of the faculty was merely advisory, 25 and emphasized faculty
authority and control in academic matters. 2 6 Furthermore, the
majority endorsed the determination of the appellate court not to resolve the issue regarding the supervisory status of the faculty.27
By examining faculty cases, Justice Powell determined that the
NLRB did not apply the managerial exclusion when: "(i) faculty authority [was] collective, (ii) it [was] exercised in the faculty's own in22 Id. at 860-61. Although the Act did not originally cover college professors, its jurisdiction
was extended to full-time university faculty in 1971. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905
(1971). When Congress amended the Act in 1974, it noted and approved the policy of the Board
in asserting coverage over educational institutions. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1051, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 12938 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
23 100 S. Ct. at 860-61. Section 152(12)(a) defines a professional employee as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii)
of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes;

29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (1976).
24 100 S. Ct. at 861. Two distinct exceptions exist, a statutory exclusion for supervisors and
a judicially implied exclusion for managers. Supervisors are defined as persons who exercise
"authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). The
supervisory exception has been applied repeatedly to professional employees. See, e.g., University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423, 426 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center. 218 N.L.R.B.
1266, 1267-69 (1975).
The Board defined managerial employee in Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320
(1947), as those "who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making
operative the decisions of their employer." Id. at 323 n.4. The Supreme Court held in NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), that such employees must be excluded from NLRA
coverage. Id. at 289. The managerial exception has only been applied by the Board, however,
to employees, both professional and non-professional, who serve "management's interests in
making their decisions, [or] are ... advised that they are management's representatives in
making them." Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). See, e.g., Sutter Community
Hosp., 227 N. L. R.B. 181, 193 (1976); General Dvnamics Corp., 213 N. L. R.B. 851, 857 (1974).
25 100 S. Ct. at 865. See id. at 863 n.17.
26 Id. at 864.
27 id. at 862.
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terest rather than in the interest of the university, and (iii) final authority rest[ed] with the board of trustees."-2 8 The majority found
that the Board abandoned the collective authority and final authority
branches in the present case and considered merely the interest
analysis.29 In its application of this analysis, the Court rejected the
contention relied on by the Board that Yeshiva faculty were not
aligned with management because they exercised independent professional judgment.3 0 Perceiving the goals of the University and the
goals of the faculty as the same, the Court disparaged the Board's
concept of faculty members acting in their own interest and em31
phasized the danger of divided loyalty.
Justice Powell maintained, however, that the holding was limited
to the facts, and he denied that the decision precluded unionization
under NLRA for all professional employees. 3 2 The majority proposed
that the case serve merely as "an appropriate starting point for
33
analysis in cases involving professionals alleged to be managerial."
The Court discarded the Board's argument that deference was due its
decision, stating that the decision was not "rationally based on articu34
lated facts [or] consistent with the Act."
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which three other
Justices joined.3 5 Arguing "that the Board's decision was neither irrational nor inconsistent with the Act," justice Brennan stressed the
concept of deference to the Board and asserted that the Board, not
the judiciary, has the primary authority to resolve conflicts. 36 Justice
Brennan emphasized that universities have two coexisting organizational structures.3 7 The first is similar to the hierarchical structure in

28 Id. at 863. See Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250 (1975); University of Miami,
213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634 (1974); Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 30 (1972).
29 100 S. Ct. at 864.
30 Id.
31 Id.

at 865. Furthermore, the Court stated that "the faculty's professional interests-as

applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the
institution.'" Id.
32 Id. at 866.
33 Id. See id. at 866-67 n.31.

34 Id. at 867. The Court based its determination of deference to the Board on the criteria
formulated in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978). 100 S. Ct. at 867. This
standard was developed from the statutory provision which states: "The findings of the Board
with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
35 100 S. Ct. at 867-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined in the dissenting opinion.
36 Id. at 867-68 (Brennan,

J.,

dissenting). See note 34 supra and accompanying text.

37 Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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industry. 38 The second, however, has no parallel in industry and
consists of a "professional network, in which formal mechanisms have
been created to bring the expertise of the faculty into the decisionmaking process." 39 The dissent concluded that the faculty at Yeshiva
and like universities effectively participate in administration but do
40
not dominate university policy.
In addition, the dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that
the faculty, in university governance, exercised their decision-making
authority in the interest of the employer. 4 1 Rather, Justice Brennan
contended that the faculty influence on academic affairs was "attributable solely to its collective expertise as professional educators, and
not to any managerial or supervisory prerogatives." 42 Noting that
the interests of Yeshiva's faculty and administration did not always
coincide, the dissent discounted the requirement of the faculty's "undivided loyalty to management [as] antithetical to the whole concept
of academic freedom." 43 Furthermore, Justice Brennan interpreted
the faculty vote for union representation to ensure negotiations with
4
the university as indicative of a divergence of interests. "
The central issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Yeshiva
was whether the full-time faculty can be excluded from the coverage
of the National Labor Relations Act because of their role in university
governance. 45 The decision, illustrating the basic tension between
the Act's purposes of including professional employees and excluding
supervisors and managers, also demonstrates the difficulty in applying
the classifications and exceptions of a statute designed for industry to
46
the structure of a university.
38 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this structure, "a formal chain of command runs from a

lay governing board down through university officers to individual faculty members and students." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally J. BALDRIDGE, POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE
UNIVERSITY 114 (1971); Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608,
614-18 (1974).

40 100 S. Ct. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent determined that the university
"retain[ed] the ultimate decisionmaking authority." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 870. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also stated: "Faculty members are
judged by their employer on the quality of their teaching and scholarship, not on the compatibility of their advice with university policy." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 858.
46 Id. at 864. Justice Brennan commented: "[Tihe Court's perception of the Yeshiva faculty's

status is distorted by the rose-colored lens through which it views the governance structure of
the modern-day university." Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Finkin, supra note 39, at
612.
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Solutions to these problems cannot be found simply by examining the statutory language. On its face, the statute covers professional
employees. 4 7 No dispute existed on this issue and the majority opinion was based on the premise that full-time faculty were professional
48
employees within the meaning of the Act.
Any employee whether professional or not, however, may be
exempted from coverage under the statutory exclusion for supervisors. 49 The NLRA provides that "[t]he term 'employee' . . . shall
not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor." 50 As previously stated, the Court in Yeshiva did not decide the question of
supervisory status. 5 1 Instead, the Court found the faculty to be managerial employees and held that as such they were excluded. 52
While the supervisory exception is clearly stated in the statute,
the managerial exception is judicially implied. 53 Consequently, managerial employees are exempted from coverage under the Act. 54 Earlier decisions of the NLRB did not expressly exclude managerial
employees but found that those who develop and enforce decisions of
management were inappropriate for inclusion in a bargaining unit
with other employees. 5 5 In a 1974 landmark decision, the Supreme
Court held in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company, Division of Textron
that Congress intended to exclude all employees properly classified as
managerial- "those who 'formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer.' "56
The distinction between managerial and professional employees
is often blurred because professional employees acting in their professional capacity frequently make judgments of great importance to
47 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). Section 152 (12) reflects the congressional intent that these
professional employees be covered by the NLRA. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1947), S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
48 100 S. Ct. at 860-61. See note 23 supra.
49 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 695 (2d Cir. 1978). See Finkin, The Supervisory

Status of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 805, 807 (1977).
50 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
51 100 S. Ct. at 862.

52 Id. at 861.
53 See note 24 supra.

54 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974).
55 See Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (summary of policy on managerial
employees). See, e.g.,

Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944); Freiz & Sons, 47

N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943).
56 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace Laundry Dry
Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)). See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424
F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB,
409 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969).
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management.5 7 In industry, "managerial authority is not vested in
professional employees merely by virtue of their professional status,
or because work performed in that status may have a bearing on
company direction." 58 However, professionals may be excluded
from the coverage of the Act when they have significant managerial
responsibility. 5 9 Medical personnel, 6 0 engineers, 6 1 and librarians 6 2
were excluded when they acted in the interest of the employer under
the vague standard of being "closely aligned with management as true
3
representatives of management." 6
In the university context, the line between professional and
managerial employees is even less clear because of the authority
structure of a university and the fact that essentially all employees of
a university are professionals. 64 Different views of university governance were espoused by the majority and the dissent in Yeshiva. 6 5 As
Justice Brennan correctly pointed out in his dissent, universities have
two coexisting organizational structures. 6 6 This dual system permitted the exercise of influence by faculty members without the posses67
sion of control.
The majority, however, perceived university governance to be a
system of collegiality in which a community of scholars is identical
with and in control of the university. 68 Arguing that the "traditions
of collegiality continue to play a significant role" at Yeshiva and like
universities, 69 the majority concluded that these universities must
rely on their faculty members to develop and implement administrative policies. 70 The determination of managerial status will depend
upon which view of university governance is adopted.
The majority's conclusion that the faculty were managerial
employees rested on the premise that the university was a self-

57
58

See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337, 339 (1955).
General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974).

59 Id. at 859.

60 Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1267-69 (1975).
61 General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 858-59 (1974).
62

University of Chicago, 205 N.L.R.B. 220, 221 (1973), enforced, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir.

1974).
General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974).
Finkin, supra note 39, at 613-14.
65 See 100 S. Ct. at 861 (majority view); id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 37-40 supra and accompanving text.
67 100 S.'Ct. at 870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 861. See N. FEHL, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY IN EAST AND WEST 36-46 (1962);
63

64

D.

KNOWLES, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

69 100 S. Ct. at 861.
70

Id. at 861 n.10.

164-68 (1962).
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governing community of scholars. 7 1 This perception overlooked the
fact that in a modern university like Yeshiva, the task of operating the
university has shifted from the faculty to the administration. 72 Acceptance of this modern concept was acknowledged by the charter
granted to Yeshiva by the Board of Regents of the New York State
Education Department. The charter granted to the Board of Trustees
and the President provided for governance by a self-perpetuating
Board of Trustees. 73 No provision was made for control by any other
institution or body. 74 Although faculty members may participate in
decision-making, they are not required to do so by the charter and
such participation does not indicate that they are serving as representatives of management. 75 Clearly the Court did not recognize these
provisions as an accurate representation of governance at Yeshiva.
In addition to relying on the concept of collegiality, the Court
imposed industrial standards in the academic area, although it
claimed to recognize that the authority structure of a university is not
the same as in industry. 76 In applying the NLRA, the Court ignored
the differences and determined that the faculty were managerial because the authority they exercised would be managerial "in any other
context." 77 The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan is especially
pertinent in emphasizing that the differences between "industrial and
academic institutions . . . preclude the blind transplanting of princi78
ples developed in one arena onto the other."
In order to determine how the Court should have imposed industrial standards in a universit, context, the underlying purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act must be examined. As previously
described by the Court, a primary purpose of the Act was to "promote peaceful settlement . . . by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation." 79 In amending
the Act, Congress extended the statute's protection to professional
employees, clearly intending that professionals should have the right
71 See note 68 supra and accompanying text.

72 100 S. Ct. at 872-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7' NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1978).
74 100 S. Ct. at 859.
" Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975).
76 100 S. Ct. at 861.

77 Id. at 864.
78 Id. at 868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79 Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). The Supreme Court
has also described a purpose of the Act as the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes
between employers and employees by providing legal remedies for the invasion of employees'
rights of self-organization and collective bargaining. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240, 255 (1939). See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National

Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv, L. Rav. 389, 389-90 (1950).
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to organize and bargain collectively."0 The goal to be achieved was
greater cooperation between management and employees. 8 ' Managerial and supervisory exclusions from the Act were based on the
right of management to have the undivided loyalty of its representa83
tives.8 2 Dual loyalty was an evil to be avoided.
Consistent with the purpose of the Act, faculty members in a
university should not be excluded from a union unless they are specifically hired as representatives of administration or act expressly to
implement management's policies. 8 4 Mere participation in university
decision making through committee activities is a duty routinely performed by university ftculty, and should be insufficient to convert a
85
faculty member into a managerial employee.
Although the Yeshiva Court ultimately concluded that an
employee would be classified as managerial when his "activities fall
outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly
situated professionals," 8 6 this standard was not employed in the instant case. Ironically, the suggested stargard of comparison with like
professionals, if applied literally, would -afford a reconciliation of professional and managerial status in a specific arena. Applying the managerial status in a flexible manner based on activities for similarly
situated professionals would lessen the likelihood of confusion, litigation, and disruption by providing clear standards for each group of
professionals to determine when their activities are deemed to be
managerial.
The consequence of the Yeshiva holding is uncertain with regard
to full-time faculty, 8 7 because the opinion contains two seemingly distinct rationales. Under the first and more predominant rationale,
Yeshiva may be interpreted to stand for the broad proposition that if
faculty at a private university act collectively and their decisions are
80

29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). During the hearings on the Taft-Hartley amendments, how-

ever, management representatives argued that professional employees were part of management

and should be excluded under the supervisory exception. Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act: Hearings on H.R. 8, etc. Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1225 (1947); Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S.55 & S.J. Res. 22 Before

the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 694 (1947).
81 Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1936).
82 General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974).
83 Finkin, supra note 49, at 810.

84 Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., 416 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1974).
85 100 S.

Ct. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

86 Id. at 866.
87 Included in the Yeshiva University classification

of full time faculty are the following:

"professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or visiting thereof,
department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans." Yeshiva Univ., 221
N.L.R.B. 1053, 1057 (1975). The collective bargaining agreement of Yeshiva University
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generally followed,"' the faculty members participating in the collective action are excluded from unionization under the NLRA.89
" 'Perfunctory' " approval of recommendations is equated to exercise
of authority. 90 This control criterion was utilized by the Court for
determining " 'managerial status' sufficient to remove [faculty] from
the coverage of the Act."'"
The extent of the application of this proposition is uncertain because of two remaining questions. First, it is unclear whether faculty
are excluded if they do not control all those areas enumerated by the
Yeshiva Court. 92 The second ambiguity concerns how often the faculty recommendations must be rejected in order to remove faculty
from managerial status and make them eligible for an acceptable
93
unit.
In the alternative to the exercise of authority rationale, the Supreme Court opinion may be interpreted for the more restrictive
holding that only limited categories of faculty must be excluded from
the bargaining unit. The Court divided the faculty that had been included in the Yeshiva unit into "assistant deans, senior professors,
and department chairmen, as well as associate professors, assistant
professors, and instructors." 94 The implication was that only the first
three groups were considered to exercise supervisory or managerial
authority by the Yeshiva Court and thus were ineligible for inclusion
in any bargaining unit.
Furthermore, a possible procedural question might have precluded the Court from reaching the merits of the Yeshiva faculty's
NLRA claim. The National Labor Relations Act provides that "[t]he
findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by
excluded deans, acting deans, directors, and principal investigators of research and training
grants. Id. at 1057. It has been a general policy that these categories are not and should not be
included. See, e.g., University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423, 426 (1976) (excluding principal
investigators); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 638 (1976) (excluding deans); Florida
S. College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 890 (1972) (excluding directors).
88 100 S. Ct. at 859. The approval of faculty decisions need not be absolute; infrequent
rejections do not detract from the exercise of faculty authority. Id. at 865 n.27.
89 Id. at 864. Decisions classified as managerial by the Yeshiva Court concerned offerings,
scheduling, and teaching of courses, and grading policies, matriculation standards, student admission, retention and graduation, size of student body, tuition, and location of a school. Id.
The Court noted, however, "that professors may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise their own
research." Id. at 866-67 n.31.
90 Id. at 859 n.3. See id. at 859-60 nn.4-6.
91 Id. at 861.
92 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.

93 See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
94 100 S. Ct. at 860.
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substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be
conclusive." 95 Under this statutory provision, the Board has the
primary responsibility of deciding questions of fact. 96 The standard
developed by the courts for applying this provision is that the Board's
decision may be reviewed for rationality and consistency with the
Act. 97 Although the majority found the conclusion of the Board to be
neither rationally "based on articulated facts [nor] consistent with the
Act," 98 the dissent, in sharp contrast, found the decision to be both
rational and consistent and within the zone of reasonableness. 99 In
Yeshiva, the Court "substitute[d] its own judgment for that of the
Board." 100

The exclusion of faculty members as managerial employees by
the Yeshiva Court may seriously disadvantage all professional
employees, the very group the NLRA was amended to protect. 10 1
When professionals "exercise authority which in any other context
.. . would be managerial," they will most likely be barred from the
protection of the Act. 102 The Yeshiva rationale, if broadly applied in
future judicial opinions, may remove the incentive for employers of
all professionals to resolve disputes through collective bargaining,
thereby defeating the basic congressional purpose of promoting
03
prompt settlement of labor disputes.'
The Yeshiva holding will threaten all universities because the
administration, by unilaterally determining the amount of authority
available to the faculty, can control the faculty's ability to unionize. If
95 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
96 Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978).
97 Id.
98 100 S. Ct. at 867.
99 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In support of the dissenting opinion, rationality should be
presumed from the expertise developed by the Board through its long experience in labor
management relations. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
100 100 S. Ct. at 868 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice Powell,
who authored the majority opinion, commented on "the undesirability of [the] assumption by
the Judicial Branch of the legislative function" in his dissenting opinion in another recent case,
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1975 (1979). Emphasizing in Cannon that
"overlapping judicial and administrative enforcement of . . . policies" relating to the entire
higher educational system "inevitably will lead to conflicts and confusion," id. at 1985, Justice
Powell noted that the Court has tended to stray from the separation of power principle of
limited jurisdiction. Id. In Cannon, Justice Powell concluded that "respect for our constitutional
system dictates that the issue should have been resolved by . . . Congress," and not by "relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the political process." Id. at 1975.
101 Finkin, supra note 49, at 807-09.
102 100 S. Ct. at 864. Note the Court's supposed claim to the contrary: "We certainly are not
suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside
.- Id.
i.. at 866.
the Act .
103 See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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they transfer enough academic issues to faculty recommendation, the
administration can justify a refusal to bargain on the mandatory collective bargaining subjects of "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment." 104 Such a result would subvert the congressional purpose of protecting professionals engaged in professional
10 5
activities from unfair labor practices.
Joan B. Kegelman
104

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides that these are the subjects of collective bargaining.

105 See note 79 supra and accompanying text. The limited growth of bargaining in univer-

sities since the extension of the Act to professionals may indicate that the alternative of collec-

tive bargaining offered to the faculty had the effect of encouraging the administration to greater
cooperation with the faculty. Finkin, supra note 39, at 611-12.

